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To put this book into perspective, I would like to congratulate the 
author for his brilliant book-length study involving painstaking 
research. Furthermore, this book is different from other writings. 
The author is a former senior military officer who has operational 
experience and has been exposed to the policy environment in his 
own way through his appointment as a Military Adviser and later 
an Officer on Special Duty in the National Security Council 
Secretariat, New Delhi.   
This office would have exposed him to intelligence and policy 
inputs from the Ministry of Defence, Service HQs, Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Research and 
Analysis Wings and Intelligence Bureau. Therefore, he would have 
formed an idea of the decision- making process at apex levels of the 
National Security Policy formulation. To my understanding, the 
regular military officer even at one, two or three-star level (with 
exceptions of Military Intelligence officers) is generally kept out of 
the civilian defence/foreign ministry policy formulation. However, 
there were cross-postings of a couple of military (read army) 
officers in the MEA and a Joint secretary from the MEA in the 
Ministry of Defence.  
This book examines the complexities of India-Pakistan relations 
which are characterised with hostility and nuclear weapons. The 
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two countries have fought four wars with each other besides 
innumerable border skirmishes almost on a monthly basis. The 
book primarily deals with the last round of hostility between the 
two countries fought in 1999 over Kargil as nuclear weapon powers 
and the fear of escalation from the conventional to a nuclear 
engagement.  
The concept of Limited War is also among the central themes 
discussed in the book and therefore merits some clarity. Limited 
War is the opposite of Total War. Both the World Wars were Total 
in terms of time, target, territory, weaponry, force levels and 
belligerents. On the other hand, Limited War is limited in terms of 
these very parameters. The India-Pakistan or India-China conflicts 
are limited to only two belligerents, territories, targets, time or 
weaponry or force levels. This is evident from the cross-border 
skirmishes of commando raids that are conducted by either side 
from time to time.           
The beauty of the book lies in its chapterisation that enables readers 
to comprehend the contents with ease. The „Introduction‟ 
highlights the basic premise that “Pakistan‟s use of terrorism as a 
foreign policy tool coupled with its penchant to seek security 
against retaliation through nuclear weapons is a substantial cause 
for instability in the India-Pakistan relationship. Future conflicts 
could, thus, take various forms, under an omnipotent shadow of 
nuclear war” (Menon, 2018).     
The introduction of nuclear weapons into the India-Pakistan 
equation has altered the nature of the relationship largely based on 
the role of force. In the Introduction, he argues, “it is the role of 
force to make the use of force unattractive to political leaderships 
on both sides” (Menon, 2018). 
Chapter Two, „The Nuclear Doctrine of France‟ is discussed with 
reference to the similarity with the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan. To 
quote “In reality, France was not considered to have sufficient 
means for a nuclear battle and, moreover, it lacked the necessary 
surface area to absorb nuclear strikes and recover from them, 
unlike the superpowers which have vast territories. Similar, in fact 
is the case with Pakistan” (Menon, 2018).        
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Chapter Three which discusses „Nuclear China‟ traces the Chinese 
quest for nuclear weapons and in the process discusses the China-
Taiwan military engagements. However, the book does not refer to 
the Sino-Soviet conflict over the Ussuri River in 1969. This was a 
case of two nuclear-armed countries engaged in conventional war 
with each other, similar to the India-Pakistan strife over Kargil. 
Arguably, the 1969 military clashes almost had the potential to 
trigger World War Three.   
During the Sumdorung Chu crisis of 1987-88, there was a reported 
instance of a Chinese tactical nuclear threat. Former Army Chief, 
General VN Sharma, has gone on record to say that a one-star rank 
People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) officer had actually threatened to 
use a tactical nuclear weapon during the stand-off with India. In 
response, the Army Chief conveyed to the PLA commander that a 
tactical nuclear weapon delivered through artillery fire would land 
either in the valley or beyond it given the circular error of 
probability involved with the targeting procedures. In such a 
situation, the Indian side, he explained, would remain unharmed 
due to bunkers that made them physically secure from such 
threats.          
Chapter Four which examines the rationale for Pakistan‟s nuclear 
weaponisation could also include the interesting views expressed 
by former Pakistan Army Chief Mirza Aslam Beg who refers to the 
April 1998 Pokhran II Indian nuclear tests. The then Prime 
Minister, Vajpayee‟s letter to the US President Bill Clinton states 
that the nuclear tests were Sino-centric but the former Pakistan 
Army Chief refutes this line of thinking. He argues that Pokhran II 
was essentially Pakistan-centric because India deployed 11 
mountain divisions along the India-China border and if there really 
was a Chinese military threat, India would not have scaled down 
these mountain divisions to be re-deployed in J&K for 
counterinsurgency operations. Such a Pakistani perspective is 
interesting from an Indian National Security viewpoint.         
In the Chapter „Deterrence Revisited – Mumbai to Uri‟, the book 
questions why India confined its response to Pakistan at the 
political and diplomatic levels and provides interesting answers to 
the same. It goes on to add that “India‟s future reaction to another 
major terrorist attack is impossible to guess” (Menon, 2018). 
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Another interesting statement is “India‟s military inaction has 
strengthened Pakistan‟s internalized narrative that India will not 
react militarily due to Pakistan‟s threat for escalation to the nuclear 
realm” (Menon, 2018).  
The concluding chapter, „The Conflation of Two Revolutions‟ states 
how the fundamental problem of prosecuting a limited war is 
rooted in the clash between two definable paradigms of military 
security. One, in which the organising construct rests on preparing 
to fight and win the war (conventional paradigm) and another in 
which an avoidance of war is the underlying goal of military 
preparations (nuclear paradigm). Paradoxically, both the nuclear 
and conventional paradigms of war coexist concurrently even 
though they do so uneasily.   
 
  
 
